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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF u·TAH, 
Plaintiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
DE'NNIS SHERMAN KINDER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case N'o. 9'778 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'T 
STATEMENT OF 'THE KIND OF CASE 
AppeHant has appealed from His conviction of 
robbery and grand larceny in the Third J udici'al 
District Court, State of u·tah. 
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the foHowing state-
ment of facts !as being a fuller coverage of the evi-
renee presented at trial. 
On ·October 30, 1961, Daniel L. Kelly, an em-
ployee of the .A:l Harris Dairy Milk Depot in Salt 
Lake City, was robbed by a m'an carrying a small-
blue-black gun of a larger caliber than a .22 ( R-
104) The robbery took place at ·about 8 o'clock p.m. 
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The robber wore a red bandana wrapped around 
the top part of his head, but the robber's face was 
exposed and he appeared to have been unshaven for 
about four days. (R-105) Mr. Kelly observed the 
robber for about 30 seconds duri'ng the holdup. The 
robber 'took about $156.83 according 'to 'Mrs. Harris, 
the proprietor ( R-144) . After the robbery occurred, 
Mr. Kelly, :an ex-convict, called the police. (R-93, 
94). The pol'ice made a routine investigation (R-92-
99). Mr. I\jeHy, after the robbery, identified 'a pic-
ture of 'a m!an, nat the appeHan't, as being the robber. 
Thereafter, after being shown a pitcture of the ap-
pellant, he identified the appellant as the robber 
( R-11 0) . At the time of trial, Mr. Kelly was con-
fined in the Utah Sta:te Prison, and 'at 'the 'time of 
the robbery was :an ex-convict (R-104, 108). Kelly, 
at the trial, 'identified the appellant ·as the robber. 
(R-107). 
Lieutenant N. B. Hayward of 'the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office 1testified that during an in-
terrogation of the appeHant in December, 1961, or 
J!anuary, 1962, the appellant admitted the AI Harris 
Dairy robbery ( R-112) . 
The day before the robbery, Henry Piep, the 
appeUant's half-brother, saw the appellant and help-
ed him paint a truck in which the appellan1t intended 
to go to Arizona (R-11'5). He noted 'that the appel-
l1ant hlad two small hand guns 'in his possession at 
tha:t time. (R-116). 
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The a ppeHan t testified that. he left Salt Lake 
City on the morning of October 30, 19'61, for Ari-
zona, and that at 8 o'clock p.m. he was about 100 
miles from Flagstaff, Ari21ona ( R-118). The !ap-
pellant further testified that he rented a motel in 
Flagstaff at about 8 to 8:30p.m. (R-119). He fur-
ther stated that he arrived in Tucson, Arizona, the 
next morning at about 10:30 \a.m. This would have 
been October 31, 1961. ( R-119) . On ·cross-examina-
tion, the prosecutor asked without objection the 
means by which appellant got ·to AriznnJa, and was 
told that appellant drove a 1955 Ford pickup truck 
(R-119). Appellant also testified tha:t the truck was 
registered to Robert Reed, 'but that he did not know 
Mr. Reed's address (R-120). ·Testimony was given 
to the license plates on the car, and the persons who 
accompanied Kinder to Arizona. Kinder stated that 
upon arrival in Tucson he and his female complanions 
registered at a motel, but denied that State's Ex-
hibit 3 was a registration card bearing his 1signa-
ture (R-124). Kinder admitted having two pistols 
in his possession, one of which was a .32 caliber, 
and also he admitted a convi'ction for a felony (R-
125). No objection to all the above testimony was 
regi'stere'd. The only objection registered by counsel 
that the prosecution was exceeding the bounds of 
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"Q. Prior to October 30th of 1961, when did 
you arrive in Salt Lake?" 
Thereafter, no further objection was imposed, 
and on cross-examination, appellant sta:ted that he 
ol11Jained 'the pickup truck, in which he had previous-
ly te~stified to having travelled to Arizona in, in Calif-
ornia and did not acquire it 'in Sialt Lake City (R-
127). Subsequently, the prosecutor again attemp'ted 
to have the appellan1t admit Exhihi1t 3 was subscrib-
ed by him, which he refused ~to admit (R-128). Ex-
hibit 3 was not adm'rtted in evidence, but from the 
record would appear to 'be :a motel signature card 
bearing the name R. ID.nder, Jr., a vehicle descrip-
tion, and a date of November 1, 19'61. 
Thereafter, the prosecutor continued without 
objection (R-133) : 
"Q. (By Mr. Leary) Mr. Kinder, wh'a:t 
was the color of the pickup that you drove out 
of Salt L'ake? 
A. Brown. 
Q. Solid brown? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Well, tell me the colors of it, please. 
A. It had a black top, very top. 
Q. I can barely hear you. 
A. I said the top, the very top was black. 
Q. What else? 
A. That's all. 
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Q. What was the other color of 'the truck? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. What were the other colors of the truck? 
A. I told you, brown and bal1ck. 
Q. What were the colors of the W eels? 
A. Black, I guess. 
Q. Well, didn't you paint this truck on the 
30th with your stepbrother, Henry Piep? 
A. Yes, sir, he helped me. 
Q. What colors did you paint it? 
A. I told you. 
MR. McRAE : If the Court please, this 
witness has testified as to alibi and whether he 
pain ted this truck has no bearing on alibi. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Leary) What colors did you 
paint it? 
A. Black. 
Q. Solid black? 
A. No. 
Q. Well, what parts did you paint then? 
A. The top. 
Q. Just the top of the cab? 
A. Right. 
Q. Nothing else? 
A. No, sir, I don't think so. 
Q. All right. And that was identically the 
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same color when you arrived 1n Tucson, Is 
that correct? 
A. Yes, sir." 
The appellant was then questioned (R-139) relative 
to his arrival in S'alt Lake, all without objection: 
"Q. Were you on October 29th? 
A. No, s'ir. 
Q. And isn't it a fact that you did not arrive 
in Salt Lake until October 29th of 1961, Mr. 
Kirrder? 
A. I arrived in s~alt Lake before that. 
Q. Did you ever have a conversation with 
anyone converning the dlate of your arrival 
in Salt Lake? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you have a conversation with Officer 
Lyman of the Salt Lake City Po1ice Depart-
ment concerning the time of your arrival in 
Salt Lake? 
A. No, sir. I'd like to refer back to that first 
question. The ~a:st question. I did have a con-
versation When I first arrived in Salt Lake. 
Q.- With whom? 
A. With my older brother. 
Q. Where did you stay when you were in 
Salt Lake? 
A. I went to see my parents at first. 
Q. Where did you stay when you arrived 
in Salt Lake, Mr. Kinder? 
A. I told you, I wen't to see my parents first. 
6 
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Q. Did you remain in a house in S!alt Lake? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. Where? 
A. At 3150 South 9th East. 
Q. And you stayed with your parents there? 
A. For a while. 
Q. How many days? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Was it one? 
A. No, it was more than one.'' 
Thereafter, the appellant objected that tJhe mlat-
ter was outside the scope of direct examination and 
the prosecutor abandoned the line of questioning 
(R-140). 
Officer Donald Lyman testified that the ap-
pellant had told him he !arrived in Salt Lake City 
on October 29, 1961, and that he acquired 'the pickup 
truck in Salt Lake City from a used car lot, and 
then painted the vehicle (R-149, 1'50). In no way 
did Officer Lyman or anyone say that the 'truck hlad 
been stolen. 
Subsequent to appeal, appellant filed two affi-
davi'ts set out in his brief, one from Kelly 'an!d the 
other from another inmate, in which Kelly said that 
Kinder was not the robber. The other prisoner's 
'affidavit said he heard Kelly say the same thing. 
No motion for new trial has been addressed to 
the 'trral court, nor 'any petition for coram nobis. 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE .A:PPELLANT CANNOT BE GRANTED A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE CLAIM OF NEWLY DISCOVERED 
EVIDENCE BECAUSE: 
A. NO MOTION OR PETITION HAS BEEN AD-
DRESSED TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
B. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE WEIGHED 
BY THE TRIAL JUDGE WHO HEARD THE CASE 
AND HE, IN HIS DISCRETION, S'HOULD FIRST DE-
TERMINE WHETHER THE NE'W TRIAL OR OTHER 
RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
C. THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF A NEW 
TRIAL WOULD NOT JUSTIFY SUCH AN ORDER. 
A. It is submi'tted by the respondent that ap-
pellant may not, for 'the first time on appea1, raise 
the question of whether the claimed newly discov-
ered eviden'ce would warrant this court in granting 
a new tri,al. The Utah law on new trials is covered 
in Title 77, Chapter 38, Utah Code Annotated 195'3. 
Section 77-38-3 (7), U.C.A. 1H5'3, provi1des that a 
new trial may be a warded: 
"(7) When new evidence has been discov-
ered, m'ateri'al to 'the defendant and which he 
could not with reasonable diligence have dis-
·covered and produced at the tri'al." 
The same Section further notes that the trial court 
shall have a hearing on an ·application for ;a new 
tri'a:l. See also 77-38-4, Utah Code Anno'tated 1953. 
The statute therefore contemplates that an applica-
tion for a new trial must be directe'd to the trial 
8 
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court. In, State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P. 2d 
(1949) the Court quoted the following with ap-
proval: 
" 'It is a matter now too well settled to admit 
of any serious dispute * * * that the question 
of granting or denying a motion for new trial 
is a matter largely within the discretion of 
the trial court. * * * This rule applies whether 
the motion is based upon insufficiency of the 
evidence or upon newly discovered evidence. 
* * * This court cannot substitu1te its discre-
tion for that of the trial court. * * * We do 
not ordinarily interfere wi'th rulings of the 
trial court in either granting or denying ia 
motion for new trial, and unless abuse of, or 
failure to exercise, discretion on the part of 
the trial judge is quite clearly shown, the rul-
ing of the trial judge will be sustained. 
'The granting or denial of a moiton for new 
trial on the ground of newly discovered evi-
dence is a matter within the trial court's dis-
cretion, which is conclusive unless abuse of 
discretion is shown.' " 
Consequently, it would appear tha:t the decisions of 
this Court have contemplated that an application 
for a new trial be addressed to the trial court. The 
Legislature has also provided by implication since 
77-38-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
"The application for a new trial must be made 
upon written notice of motion designating the 
grounds upon which it is made, and must be 
served and filed within five days after the 
rendition of the verdict or decision. * * *." 
9 
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If the matter is to be heard within five days of the 
tri:al, which was not done in this case, the obvious 
conclusion is tha:t the matter should be directed to 
the trial court. The general rule is noted in 24 C.J.S., 
Criminal Law, § 146'5: 
"As a general rule, and in the absence of some 
statutory provisions pLacing the power else-
where, the jurisdiction to grant a new trial, 
and to enterta'in an application therefor, rests 
in fue court in which the trial was had, even 
though a motion for a new trial is not essen-
tial to :a review by an appellate court; and, 
ordinarily, no other court can exercise juris-
diction in this respect. * * *." 
and at page 230, 24 C.J.S., ·supra: 
"An appellate court has ordinarily no power 
to entertain a motion for a new trial in a 
court of first ins·tance subject to its appellate 
jurisdiction, and under constitutioll!al and sta-
tutory provisions it has been held that a par-
ticular appellate court had no power to enter-
tain an ~application for new trial. Neither, 
under constitutional provisions specifying tha:t 
the jurisdiction of an appellate court shall be 
appellate only, may such court direct the trial 
judge in a court of original jurisdiction to 
entertain a motion for new trial. * * *" 
In this regard, it should be noted that Article 
VIII, Section 4, of the U ta:h Constitution provides 
that except fDr the extraordinary writs, the juris-
diction of the Utah Supreme Court will be appeHate 
only. Consequently, since the claim of newly dis-
10 
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covered evidence has never been passed on by the 
trial court, this court may not review the evidence. 
B. Even were the evidence presented by the 
affidavits filed by the appellant deemed convincing, 
that evidence should be weighed by the trial judge 
that heard the evidence. Thus, 24 C.J.S., Crimilllal 
Law, p. 228 notes: 
"As a general rule, the judge who presided at 
the trial is the proper judge to hear and de-
termine a mo'tion for a new trial. The ends of 
justice would generally thus be better served." 
Since the trial judge tha;t heard the case is still 
available, and since he had an opportunity to weigh 
the evidence first hand, view the demeanor of the 
witness, and appraise their credibility, he would 
be the person best suited to ascertain whether or 
not the present allegations of Mr. Kelly are true 
or whether his change of mind is based on a change 
of circumstances. 
Nor, is the appellant's position prejudiced by 
the fact that he failed to make a motion for new 
trral within five days as required by 77-38-4, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, since he may, of course, pro-
ceed by coram nobis, State v. Woodard, 108 Utah 
390, 160 P. 2d 432 ( 1945) ; Neal v. Beckstead, 3 
Uta:h 2d 403, 285 P. 2d 129 ( 19'55) ; and the same 
rule, that the petition should be directed 'to the 'tri'a'l 
judge and court that heard the case, i's applicable. 
Bolton v. State, 223 Ind. 308, 60 N.E. 2d 7 4'2; 
11 
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Ernst v. State, 181 Wis. 155, 193 NW 978; 30 Am. 
J ur., Judgments, Sec. 736. 
C. It is submrtted finally that the evidence 
contained in the affidavits is not sufficient to war-
rant this court or any other court granting relief, 
v~a coram nobis or new tri~ai. The affidavit of Charles 
G. Anderson is merely an impeaching ·statement and 
will not support a motion for new tri1al. State v. 
Hawkins, 81 Utah 16, 1'6 P. 2'd '713; Jeter v. Com-
monwealth, 268 Ky. 285, 104 S.W. ·2d 979; 24 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law, Sec. 14·60. 
Kelly's affidavit must be 'taken in conside~ation 
of the fact that it states that he made a mistake 
in his identity and changed his mind. the 'affidavit 
is gener:ally equivocal, and it should be remembered 
that Kelly, Anderson and Kinder are all confined 
together in prison. In People v. Steele, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 
214 ( 1946) the New York eourt recognized the per-
jurious and concocted recantations of a state's wit-
ness would not be such newly discovered evidence 
as would justify setting aside ~a judgment on coram 
nobis. The court noteed that recantations must be 
viewed in consideration of 'the circumstances in which 
they were made. 
In the instant 'case, there is still substantial 
evidence connecting the a ppeUant to the crime. First, 
his half brother testifield to seeing him in possession 
of gun·s the day before the robbery. Second, appel-
12 
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lant admitted the possession of two ·pistols. Third, 
appellant admi'tted the crime to police officers. 
Fourth, appellant just happened to leave for Ari-
zona at a time close to the time of the robbery, after 
changing the color of his vehicle. The 'above facts 
when viewed against Kelly's guarded and equivocal 
affidavit, and the fact ·that the affidavft was made 
at the Pri1son where both were serving, make it 
manifest that the "newly discovered evi'dence" is 
not of su~h a nature that, had the jury had such 
evidence in addition to that presented, appellant 
would probably have been ·acquitted. Ward v. Turner, 
1'2 Utah 2d 310, 366 ·p. 2d 72 (1961). 
POINT II. 
NO ERROR REQUIRING REVE-RSAL WAS CRE-
ATED BY THE PROSE1CUTOR'S CROSS-EXAMINA-
TION. 
In the appellant's second point he contends that 
the trial court ·committed error in the cross-ex:amin-
ation of the appellant · (1) because the evidence eli-
cited tenided to prove the commission of another 
crime, and ( 2) the cross-examination exceeded 'the 
scope of direct examination. 
As to both points, it is submitted tha't the :ap-
pellant can make no cl·aim for relief because he 
waived these objections at trial. On cross-examina-
tion, the prosecutor asked the appellant how he got 
to ·Tucson, Arizona, the type of vehicle he used, who 
13 
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the vehicle was registered to, whether the vehicle 
was registered in Utah, and the State in which the 
license plates were issued which it carried (R-119, 
120, 1'21). No objection was made to any of this 
testimony. 
Thereafter, the prosecutor cross-examined the 
appellant as to his activi'ties while in Tucson and 
what he did upon arrival. The first objection of 
counsel on scope of cross-e:)damination, or any dther 
objection relevant to the claim on appeal is when 
counsel objected to a question as to when the appel-
lant arrived in Salt L'ake City prior to October 30, 
1961, the day appellant said he left for Arizona 
( R-126). The objection wa:s expressly limited to 
contention that 'the time appellant arrived in Salt 
Uake City had no "be'aring" on the case. The prose-
cutor indicated it w.as prelimin'ary inquiry -concern-
ing the vehicle, which point appellant had previosly 
testified concerning and wrthou!t objection ( R-1'26). 
The objection was overruled (R-127). Thereafter, 
the following questions were asked again without 
further objection (R-1'27): 
"Q. (By Mr. Leary) When di'd you !arrive 
in Sal1t Lake prior to October 30th of 1961? 
A. I don''t rem~ember the exact date. 
Q. How did you come 'to Salt Lake? 
A. How did I come to Salt Lake? 
Q. Yes. In what type of· vehicle? 
14 
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A. You mean prior to this date? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I come by car. 
Q. You didn't h'ave a pickup truck until you 
got to Salt Lake, i'S that right? 
A. No,sir. 
Q. How many days prior to October 30th did 
you acquire the 19155 Ford Pickup truck that 
you were talking about? 
A. In the time I went back to- in 'the time 
from v;hen I went to ·California and back. 
Q. Well, let me 1ask it thi's way. You stated 
that this vehicle belonged to Robert Reed? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you don't know his address. 
A. No, sir, I don't know his a:ddres~s. 
Q. All right. Did you acquire 'th'i's vehicle 
in Salt Lake City, the Ford pickup truck? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you ever state to anyone that you 
ha:d? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Nuw, it was in this same pickup truck 
that you drove to Tucson, is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. Now Mr. Kinder, I'll show you 
again State's proposed Exhibit No. 3 and I'll 
ask you to examine the exhibit aguin and tell 
me whether or not any of the writing that 
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Subsequently, after attempts 'by the prosecutor to get 
appellant to admit Exhibit 3, the m·dtel card, W1as 
in his handwriting, the prosecutor ~continued without 
objection ( R-1'33) : 
"Q. (By Mr. Leary) Mr. Kinder, what was 
the co'lor of the pickup that you drove out of 
Salt Lake? 
A. Brown. 
Q. Solid brown? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Well, 'tell me the colors of it, please. 
A. It had a bl:ack top, very top. 
Q. I can barely he'ar you. 
A. I said the fbop, the very top was 'black. 
Q. What else? 
A. Tha1t's all. 
Q. What wa's the other color of the truck? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. W'hJat were the other colors of the truck? 
A. I told you, brown and black. 
Q. What were the colors of the wheels? 
A. Black, I guess. 
Q. Well, didn't you pain't this truck on the 
30th with your stepbrdther, Henry Piep? 
A. Yes, sir. He helped me. 
Q. What colors did you painlt it? 
A. I told you. 
16 
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MR. McRAE : If the Court please, this 
witness has testified as to alibi and whether 
he painted this truck has no bearing on alibi. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Leary) What colors did you 
paint it? 
A. Black. 
Q. Solid black? 
A. No. 
Q. Well, wha:t parts did you paint them? 
A. The top. 
Q. Just the top of the cab? 
A. Right. 
Q. Nothing else? 
A. No, sir, I don't think so. 
Q. All right. And 'that was the identically 
the s'ame color when you arrived in Tucson, 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you registered in the motel? 
A. What motel?" 
The only objection registered 1to the last quoted mat-
ter was to m'a!teriality not to scope. Finally, (R-138, 
139) 'the same questions 1as to the appellant's arrival 
in Salt Lake were asked !and answers taken without 
objection. Based on the above, it i's submitted th'at 
appellant waived any claim he may have had by 
( 1) not making his objection on the correct grounds, 
17 
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State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P. 2d 72'5 (1947); 
State v. Mathews, 375 P. 2d 39'2 (U'tah 1962), and 
('2) by initially allowing evidence to come in with-
out objection with reference to the vehicle and not 
continuing his objections of the time of arr'ival in 
Salt Lake. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., 
§ 348 notes: 
"It is a general rule that, in order to take ad-
vantage of the admission of evidence by the 
tri:al court as error and to secure a reversal 
of its judgment upon appeal, the evidence must 
be objected to in the trial court. * * *" 
Secondly, it is submi'tted that the evidence in 
no way tends to show thaJt 'the iappellant committed 
any other crime except by ~the mos't flexible im'agina-
tion. It irs obvious from the record thaJt the prose-
cutor was endeavoring to l'ay a sufficient founda-
tion connecting the appeHant Wi1th the motel regis-
tration card, Exhibit 3, by wh'ich he would ·destroy 
the appellant'·s alibi. N'O where in the record does 
it appear that the prosecutor rasked the appellant 
whetther he bought or stole the vehicle, nor were any 
prejudicial remarks made tlra't could be deemed ac-
cusatory as was the case in State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 
2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961). The means by which 
1appellant travelled to Arizona, ~he motel registra-
tion and the circumstances surrounding his leaving 
Salt Lake were all directly relevant to the validity 
18 
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of his .claim of alibi. SiJ.lce no tangible evidence was 
before the jury except s'trniried supposition tha;t 
would allow them to conclude that appell'anrt stole 
the vehicle in which he tra veiled to Arizona, and 
since defense counsel m·ade no objection or side bar 
asserti1on ~to the ·court that such Wlas wha;t the prose-
cutor was endeavoring to ·show, and finally, since 
the prosecutor's obvious intention was to lay a :foun-
dation for Exhibit 3 with which to impe·ach the ap-
pellant as to the time he left Sal1t Lake, no reason-
able basis to claim that the prosecu'tor !attempted to 
prove andther crime is supportable. 
'Third, it is subm!~ted tha1t even if the prosecu-
tor had shown that appellant stole !the vehicle with 
which he went 'to Arizona, such would be :admis-
sible. The facts would show that the day before the 
robbery, ~the ·appellant possessed two hand guns, 
one of which was similar to tha:t used in the robbery, 
thaJt the aJ;>pellan t changed the color of the vehicle 
he used, the next day or so, in going to Arizona. 
This evidence, if coupled with a sh!owing 'that the 
appeUan't ·stole the vehicle the day or so befrore the 
ro'l1bery, would 'tend to show a plan or design for 
committing the crime 1an'd then fleeing the state. In, 
State v. Kappas, 100 Utah 27 4, 114, P. 2d 205 
(1941) this court approved a showing th!a:t the de-
fendant had stolen other sheep than those with 
which he was charged with stealing. The court said: 
19 
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"On the question of proof of other offenses, 
the rule is tha:t a defendant, on trial for a cer-
tain offense, must be convicted if at all by 
evidence showing he is guHty of tha:t offense 
alone, and proof of his commission of other 
unconnected crimes must be excluded. Excep~ 
tions to the rule are found in such situations 
as those in which the prosecution is permitted 
to prove the identifica:tion of the accused, mo-
tive, intent, plan, or knowledge. * * * And it 
is also competent to show that the offense 
cHarged Was part of a common scheme which 
may include one or more o'ther offenses. * * *" 
In, State v. Harries, 118 U'tah 2'60, 2'21 P. 2d 
605 (1950), 'the appellant was convicted of receiv-
ing a bribe. Evidence of dther offenses, selling liquor 
to private ·clubs, was admitted to show a common 
scheme or desiign. This court noted: 
"It is asserted by 'the defendant that evidence 
of other offenses, particularly with reference 
to the sale of liquor to other clubs, Wlas in-
admissible as to tended to convict defendant 
of crimes with which he was hot charged. 
Evidence of other offenses 'is admi'ssihle when 
such evidence has a tendency diredtly 'to estab-
lish the particular crime. In addition, evidence 
of other like crimes is usually competent to 
prove a specific crime when it tends to estab-
lish mdtive, intent, the :a:bsence of mi'stake or 
accident, or a common scheme or plan embrac-
ing the commission of 'two or more crimes so 
related to each other than proof of one tends 
to establish the others. Any pertinent fact 
wh1ich throws light upon the subject under 
judicial consideration, the accused''s guilt or 
20 
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innocense of the crime for which he is charged, 
is admissible. Such fact is not ·to be excluded 
merely because it m1ay also prove or 'tend to 
prove that the accused has committed another 
similar crime. Relevant and material evidence 
does not become irrelevant or immaJterial 
merely because it points to other offenses." 
See also State v. Trogstad, 98 Utah 565, 100 P. 2d 
(1940). 
Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd., Col. II, § 2'38 com-
" Any act, which under the circumstances and 
according to experience as naturally inJter-
preted and applied would indicate 1a probable 
design, is relevant and admissible." 
The evidence of stealing a vehicle, and painting 
it, would clearly indicate preparation for flight 
after ·fue anticipated commission of the robbery. 
Johnson v. State, 70 Okl. Cr. 270, 106 P. 2d 149. As 
Wigmore notes, this ·rs prim'arily a matter of the 
trial 'Court's discretion, and here where there is a 
logical connection between the two offenses the 
'probative value" of such evidence is apparent and 
no c~aim of error is supporta:ble. State v. Torgerson, 
4 Utah 2d 5'2, 286 P. 2d 800 (1955) .. 
Fourth, it is submi~~ted that the evidence in-
troduced did ndt exceed the proper bounds of 'the 
scope of direct examination, even if it is deemed 
there was no waiver of the issue. In the instant 
case, the appellant ;contended by way of alibi that 
at the time of the commission of the crime alleged 
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he Wias on his way to Arizona. The appellant did 
not clearly object ·to any of the testimony relating 
to ownership of the veh'ilcle, and on page 127 of 
'the record, it i1s noted ~that 1the prosecutor went into 
the date of acquisition of the vehicle. ·This wa·s a~ter 
an objection (R-1'26) which was directed to the 
scope of examination !and relevancy. See ·Page 14, 
infra. 
The objection m:ade was the only obj~ction as 
to ·scope of examination. I't is submitted that the ex-
amination was proper. It i's noted that by virtue 
of Section 77-44-2, ·utah Code Annota!ted 19'5"3, the 
rul~s of evidence relating Ito .scope of cross-examinla-
tion ·'are those generally appJilcable in civil cases. 
State v. Murphy, 9'2 Utah 382, 68 P. 2d '1'88 '(193'7). 
Therefore, error would only be claimable if the in-
formation sought as to the 'time of acquisition of the 
vehicle was beyond the rea·somble 'scope of cross-
exam'in:ation permi1ssible from the direct examina-
tion. I't is submitted 'that it was 'an appropriate 
exercise of the trial court''s discretion. The general 
rule in· this area is. ndted in Abbott, Crimirwl Trial 
Practice, 4th Ed., § 313: 
"By the English rule which is followed in 
·several of the states ;a witness who has sworn 
and gives some evidence, however formal or 
unimportant, m~ay be cross-examined in rela-
tion 'to all matters involved in the issues. But 
a stricter rule, sometime's called by way of 
distin'Ction the 'American rule.' obtains in the 
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Federal and very many of the s~tate courts. 
Under this rule the cross-examination of a 
witness is limited to an inquiry as to the facts 
and circumstances connected with the matters 
stated in his direct eXJamination. In the appii-
cation of this rule much is left to the discre-
tiiOn of the trial court. 
Under the usual 'interpretation of this rule 
a cross-examina:tion always may include what-
ever tends to qualify or explain the direct 
testimony of a witness 1and to develop and 
unfold the whole transaction about which he 
has only been partially interrogated.'' 
The weight of recent opinion as to the proper 
rule to be promulga:ted favors wide latitude. Mc-
Cormi1ck, Evidence, § 27 ; Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd 
Ed., §§ 1886-1889; Degnan, Non-Rules Evidence 
Law: Cross-Examination, 6 Utah L. Rev., p. 323, 
330 (19'58), Model Code of Evidence, Rule 105(h). 
Although the Utah court has not adopted the 
English rule, i~t will appear from an analysis of the 
more recent ·cases from this coutt on the 'subject 
tha:t the more restrictive rule is not necessarily the 
applicable standard, but ra:ther one of reasonable 
discretion is arppropos. The appellant's principal re-
liance is placed on the case of State v. Vance, 38 
Utah 1, 110 P1ac. 434 (1910). 1 This ·case is clearly 
distinguishable from the instant one since the de-
fedant limited his testimony to the poisoning of 
his wife, whereas 'the prosecutor was allowed :to go 
1 This case has been soundly criticized. Degnan op. cit., p. 335. 
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into instances of beatings given by defendant to his 
wife. The insttan't case is no where near so flagT~ant. 
Further, the Vance case was burdened by some mis-
apprehensions of constitutional problems, again not 
raised or directly present here. 
In, State v. Murphy, supra, this court ·sta'ted: 
"* * * reviewing cour't ought to be very care-
ful, and should hesitate long before reversing 
judgments upon the ground that the trial 
court either restricted or enlarged the scope 
of cross-examination.'' 
The court further noted that generally the scope 
of cross-examination was a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. See also McCormick, 
Evidence, § 24, p. 4 7 : 
"Accordingly the earlier and even many of 
the recent cases in jurisdictions adopting the 
resltric~tive rule in an yof its forms, emphasize 
the power of the trial judge to allow devia-
-tion's in his di8cre1tion. Tt has been ·said, in-
deed, that both the courts fiollowing the wide-
open and those adop'ting the restri~tive prac-
tice 'recognize the discretionary power of the 
trial court to allow varia;tions from the cus-
tom'ary order and decline ordinarily to con-
sider as 1an error any variation sanctioned by 
the trial court.' " 
The ca.Jse of In r.e Bryan's Estate, 82 lTtab 390. 
25 P. 2d 602 ( 1933). 'This court said as to the lati-
tude of cross-examination, p. 403, Utah Reports: 
"* * * The rule permits great latitude on cross-
examination when the defense is not some-
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thing consisting entirely of new material, but 
is a denial of the allegations made by the con-
testant and where by cross-examination the 
proponent seeks to di1sprove the very case the 
witness has made for the party calling him. 
* * *" 
Clearly, where the i'ssue is one of alibi, as in 
the ins:tant case, which amounts to 'a general denial 
of the crime rather than some affirm~ative defense, 
the Bryans Estate rule allowing great latitude 'should 
be allowed. The inquiry as 'to the time of 'acquisition 
of the vehicle was directly of concern to explain 
and rebut the :appellant'S alibi since it was connected 
to 'the question of the means used by the appellant 
to get to his place of ·claimed alibi. Further, since Ex-
hibit 3 would appear to have refuted that alibi and 
impeached the accused, it was necessary to establish 
that the vehicle registered on Exhibit 3 was the 
same one as was owned or possessed by appellant, 
and consequently, the time and place of acquisition 
was directly connected wl!th the overall claim of 
alibi. It is submitted that such inquiry was properly 
a ma:tter · within the 'Sound d!scretion of the trial 
judge~ 
Finally, it is submitted 'thaJt the limited inquiry 
as to the time of acquisition of 'the vehicle, even if 
excessive as to scope of examination, was not pre-
judicial to the appeHan t in view of his admiissions 
of guilt, his proximity and connection wi1th the crime 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the tools of commission of the crime, and the 
obvious perjury of the appellant viza vis Exhibit 3. 
The Legislature has stated that a case will not be 
reversed except for substan!tial errors effecting the 
rights of an accused. Error will not be presumed. 
Sec. 77-42-1, U.C.A. 19'53. Clearly, such a si~tuartion 
of harmless error is the best that can be made out 
here. 2 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has approached the wrong court 
in his eff:ort 'to seek a new trial, and 'therefore has 
no righ1t to such an order from 1this court. Appel-
lant's contention on proof of other crimes is not 
well taken since ( 1) i1t was W1aived; ( 2) it did in 
fa·ct not prove other crimes and (3) even if it did, 
it was relevant to show a de'Sign and preparation 
for the crime. Secondly, the evidentiary claim on 
exceeding the scope of direct examination is not 
well taken since ( 1) it W1as waived; ('2) the proper 
bounds of cross-examination was n6t exceeded and 
2 Appellant has also contended that the evidence allowed for im-
peachment on a collateral matter, apparently contending that the 
rebuttal of appellant's testimony on the acquisition of the vehic'le 
was of such a nature. The rebuttal testimony would only be im.;. 
peachment on a collateral matter if such matter was neither rele-
vant nor material to the case. MC'Gormick, Evidence, p. 101 et seq; 
Anderson v. Thmnas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142 (1945); State 
v. Nell, 59 Utah 68, 202 Pac. 7 (1921). The trial judge's opinion in 
this area is directly persuasive of this issue. He said: 
"Well, the court has ruled previously and the court feels that 
the truck is 'integrally wrapped up in the alibi situation; that 
'is, the vehicle with whi·ch, according to the defendant's testi-
mony, he went from Salt Lake City to Tucson." 
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( 3) if the bounds of 'the trial court's discretion 
was exceeded, it was not prejudicial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRAT'T KESLER 
.A:ttorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Deputy Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
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